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A. Introduction
In the past 20 years international cooperation has seen a surge of various types of regulatory schemes beyond the classical intergovernmental approaches.​[3]​ New forms of private and hybrid governance networks have complemented and at times challenged existing State-to-State dominated models. While private or mixed authority in international cooperation is not new,​[4]​ its extent, diversity, scope, and impact is. While new approaches have mushroomed, intergovernmental policy-making has also undergone change, mostly through increasing reliance on transgovernmental networks representing various domestic public policy areas and sub-units of the State formerly detached from direct participation in international politics.​[5]​ The question then arises what the turn towards competing, overlapping, or complementing regulatory schemes means for existing transgovernmental networks that operate in the shadow of the formal foreign policy apparatus of the nation-State? The Chapter focuses on so-called informal international lawmaking.​[6]​ We examine the processes of policy-making that underpin international law and the role of informal governance models where public actors play a prominent role and pursue public policy objectives.​[7]​ We exclude new forms of cooperation among equal partners through two- or three-sector collaboration, generally known as public-private partnerships (PPPs).​[8]​ Notwithstanding the strong focus on lawmaking through national governmental agencies, we also address in our conceptualization governance networks that include the participation of private actors or some regional and international organizations (IOs).​[9]​ Thus, we focus on cases in which State actors dominate process and outcome. The notion of informal captures in our view a more ad hoc nature and functional forms of cooperation detached from the formal rules usually applicable in IOs.
While many of the emerging transgovernmental networks have been studied prominently in international law (IL) and international relations (IR), the latter discipline has largely redirected its attention away from these types of networks. IR scholars have been attracted by the prospects of private authority, the emergence of conceptual tools to analyse private power, and growing expectations of significant contributions by newer forms of private and hybrid partnerships. As a result, IR scholars have to some degree overlooked the changing character of network-based informal cooperation among public actors. This stands in contrast to the field of IL which traditionally has studied international politics and law focusing on governmental actors, therefore giving preference to transgovernmental schemes over those largely dominated by private actors. This bias can be explained by historically-induced expectations that IL (whether hard or soft) is still predominantly the business of governmental actors. Put differently, international cooperation without proper participation of nations does not provide a promising starting point for traditional IL.​[10]​
This Chapter is arranged as follows. In section B we discuss structural changes that have impacted on the balance of international governance schemes and attempt to locate informal international lawmaking (IN-LAW). Section C offers a taxonomy of IN-LAW schemes. Section D reflects on existing IR theories and suggests that existing approaches have not offered sufficient analytical leverage to allow an understanding to be gained of the politics and outcomes of newer forms of IN-LAWs. Section E presents a framework based on principal-agent theory to account for the degree to which governmental agencies and regulators might establish transgovernmental networks in the policy processes underpinning IN-LAWs. Section F maps the balance between principal and agency costs and relates these to performance. Sections E and F also illustrate the variation in IN-LAW activity and transgovernmental governance with examples from climate change cooperation. Section G concludes.
B. Structural changes and effects for IN-LAW schemes
With globalization accelerating since the early 1990s (and growing demand for addressing various forms of externalities) international governance schemes have undergone substantial change. While global governance continues to be characterized by governance without a global government,​[11]​ the composition of actors influencing the allocation of resources and ‘exercising control and co-ordination’​[12]​ has changed. We are witnessing a relative shift or, at the very least, diversification from a largely State-led to private and hybrid systems of authority.​[13]​ In addition, policy fields increasingly overlap and interaction between regimes is characterized by fuzzy borders.​[14]​ Governance as a ‘purposive act of “steering” a society or policy’ involves more and at times competing networks.​[15]​ While globalization has provided opportunities for creating new forms of cooperation, fuelled by an increase in public awareness of the downsides (as well as the prospects) of globalization, additional factors have contributed to the rise of private actors.​[16]​ These include the emergence of national and international opportunity structures for deliberation and politicization following the end of the Cold War (and ensuing democratization processes), as well as the growing access to low-cost information technology which is assisting groups in overcoming classical collective action problems.​[17]​
While the above transformation in global governance is an area of growing interest and study, IR theory has neglected the relative decline in IN-LAW-type transgovernmental networks in comparison to newer types of cooperation schemes involving private authority.​[18]​ According to some authors, the role of States (and IOs) themselves seem to have been transformed, and they are increasingly carrying out a background function, described as managing, orchestrating, facilitating, or steering, and departing from a monopolist application of political authority.​[19]​ Others, however, have contested the assumption of the decline of the State by pointing to the strong presence of the State, particularly industrialized countries, in vetting, funding, and steering of hybrid networks​[20]​ as well as to the ability of powerful States to use the multiple emerging fora of governance to their advantage.​[21]​
As a result of the shifting focus on the changing nature of State involvement in schemes dominated by private actors or public-private collaborations, IR scholars have neglected to consider how the overall transformation that has taken place has affected transgovernmental governance schemes themselves. While these schemes may have suffered a relative decline vis-à-vis other schemes as the State increasingly engages non-State actors in informal governance, structural factors (and competition with other schemes) have also opened up new opportunities for State actors interacting directly in informal settings bypassing strict oversight by the public. In particular, regulatory experts in policy areas originally detached from direct international cooperation may find themselves increasingly within transnational governance networks.​[22]​ Informal transgovernmental mechanisms could also be established by national bureaucracies seeking informal mechanisms to bypass or break various deadlocks in intergovernmental cooperation, or to enhance the implementation capacity and regulation-related services where such mechanisms are absent in a formal intergovernmental treaty or organization. Indeed, climate change regulation and governance has been an arena which exemplifies the proliferation of IN-LAW practices alongside the largely private and hybrid networks.​[23]​ As already suggested, however, the universe of transgovernmental networks and IN-LAW schemes has not attracted adequately focused theoretical and empirical analyses in political science beyond studies broadly concerned with the changing nature of transnational governance and the multilateral system.
C. The universe of IN-LAW schemes
How do we conceptualize the range of activities falling under IN-LAW and what type of outputs do we observe? Firstly, we define the transgovernmental networks operating as IN-LAWs, following the conceptualization by Keohane and Nye and later Risse-Kappen as cross-border collaborative activities that involve sub-units of government which are ‘not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments’.​[24]​ Such networks are thus involved in transnational governance, but typically do not have formal authority to negotiate legally binding agreements. Secondly, we suggest—as for any governance scheme—focusing on the functions these networks are carrying out and mapping them across the policy cycle (Figure 3.1). The functions can be quite diverse; they may include the ‘diffusion of information, knowledge and norms, the pooling and distribution of financial, managerial, and technical resources; and (. . .) the negotiation and establishment of a set of norms, rules, and standards (. . .)’.​[25]​ ​[26]​ From the above we propose to separate the various tasks into two interlinked public goods alongside the policy cycle. The first public good is objective-setting (eg general rules, standards, and specific obligations) and the second relates to service provision that is based on existing agreed objectives (eg information exchange, advice, technical assistance, capacity building, and implementation). Figure 3.1 maps intermediate outputs throughout the regulatory cycle and sketches the elements of the two types of public goods.​[27]​ We posit that transgovernmental networks are more actively engaged in either objective-setting or service provision; few networks will be overseeing all functions along the entire policy cycle. Some networks are only active at one specific point in time (eg in agenda-setting or final implementation).
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The provision for the first public good (objective-setting) can be further subdivided into three separate stages. An initial important step in any political system is agenda-setting.​[28]​ Some types of IN-LAWs, such as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate in the climate change arena, launched in 2009 by the US Department of State and 17 counterparts representing both industrialized and developing countries with substantial impact on climate change, might prove influential at this stage where it is decided which forum will be playing an important role, which ideas and principles are to be followed, and which actors are to be invited to participate. The second stage involves processes of elaborating rules, standards, and the like. For instance, in the area of macro-economic cooperation, the International Competition Forum allows for the elaboration of formal or informal standards on how to address anti-competitive behaviour by firms. Whereas the agenda might have been set elsewhere, some transnational governance networks may play a driving role in designing new or modified objectives. In the context of climate cooperation, for example, the Climate Action Plan adopted jointly by the US New England States and Eastern Canadian Provinces, establishes a set of soft goals and normative commitments to guide regulatory and policy activities in these States and Provinces for tackling climate change. While these objectives and norms are to some extent informed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they do not seek to implement the Convention but rather constitute a new set of parallel voluntary rules on climate action. We stipulate that during rule-setting, actors are largely cognizant of distributional effects of their activities, and their negotiation behaviour is largely driven by the degree of political salience of a particular issue. The third stage of the process of objective-setting is about reaching agreement on how to go about ensuring compliance (either through soft law or hard law instruments; sticks or carrots) with agreed objectives. In some cooperation areas, compliance instruments are either implicitly agreed (some sort of reporting requirements) or might be completely inexistent. Since informal transgovernmental networks are voluntary, provisions for compliance instruments are likely to be limited (eg soft instruments such as regular reporting and exchange of information).
The second type of public good (forms of service provision), we argue, is related to the implementation of some objectives that have been set by internal or external schemes (eg agreed within IOs, clubs (eg G20, G7), or IN-LAWs). Here, once again, we suggest differentiating between three stages. In the first stage, there is a process related to the interpretation of the exact scope of activity envisaged by a particular set of laws, rules, or IN-LAWs.​[29]​ Contracts defining the objectives and role of parties are by definition incomplete and by giving authority to IN-LAWs to assist or manage implementation, there is room for discretion. As actors might disagree on the exact reading of their mandates, IN-LAWs could advance a commonly agreed interpretation or necessary procedures.​[30]​ Second, a deliberation process sets out how best to carry out the service provision (eg financing, technical assistance, projects, etc) to meet the defined objectives. Some instruments are defined in contracts, others still need agreement. Third, the micro-implementation stage starts (the actual provision of a service) with the possibility of further delegating tasks to other transnational schemes or to third actors. IN-LAWs could specialize in one or more functions in the service provision stage of the policy cycle. The Country Studies Program, launched in 1993 with financial support of the US Department of Energy, involved governmental counterparts in developing and transition countries in both clarifying reporting requirements envisaged by the UNFCCC and in establishing commonly agreed methodologies and strengthening capacity for meeting such requirements.
Finally, based on our definition, we may differentiate between pure transgovernmental schemes and IN-LAWs with participation of other actors. While in some governance schemes (eg Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Financial Stability Board, International Competition Network, or the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate), representatives of ministries and regulatory authorities interact among themselves, others include the private sector (eg International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) and The Climate Action Plan of the US New England States and Eastern Canadian Provinces).
Public actors might have two prime reasons to involve the private sector: first, regulators may borrow the technical expertise they lack, therefore increasing the efficiency of the process. Second, through involving market actors, regulators may ultimately improve the overall acceptance by those being regulated, which will increase the overall degree of implementation.​[31]​ One of the drawbacks of close cooperation across the public-private divide is that these interactions could lead to collusion between a set of regulators and certain market actors or more seriously could result in ‘regulatory capture’ by market actors.​[32]​ Privileging vested interests is likely to have a negative impact on overall public policy interests.
D. Theoretical frames in IR
Before outlining our framework of analysis for capturing the nature and role (and potential performance) of IN-LAW, we briefly review key theoretical approaches and map different expectations from the three grand schools of IR.
The liberal-institutionalist school has provided, since the late 1970s, theoretical explanations as to the function of international institutions. Institutions and issue-specific international regimes have been viewed as important mechanisms for overcoming cooperation problems by providing information and transparency, by leading to lower transaction costs, as well as by tackling compliance problems.​[33]​ The focus of this literature has been decidedly intergovernmental although the concept of international regimes did include broader conceptualizations of regimes consisting of formal as well as informal rules, norms, and decision-making procedures.​[34]​ As already indicated, current scholarship has been paying more attention to networks as mechanisms of governance emphasizing the prominent participation of private actors. Fewer studies focus on transgovernmental networks and new informal soft-law types of orchestration by governments or IO actors.​[35]​ Most of these contributions see IN-LAW as a natural and benign attempt to compensate for the lack of hard law using a variety of orchestration techniques, in particular the power to convene, endorse, and provide resources.​[36]​
If we turn to realism, there are two strands of realist thinking as to the role of international institutions. One group of realists would see any transgovernmental network as serving the interests of leading powers.​[37]​ National bureaucrats meeting within the international setting are mainly concerned with representing national interests. In addition, only those countries with sufficient market power matter in interest aggregation. Put simply, outcomes from any cooperation (including IN-LAW) reflect the preferences of the most important powers.​[38]​ When big powers fail to agree, the outcome will be deadlock with the result that dominant actors engage in forum-shopping. Another strand of realism considers agencies beyond the nation-States as lacking any autonomous impact on outcomes.​[39]​ If these schemes lack implementation power, any cooperation outcome is modest at best.
Social-constructivists see these networks mainly as norm-setters and arenas of norm diffusion, attributing real agency to them.​[40]​ Governance networks will engage in various types of socialization process. Checkel for instance sees three sequential steps for achieving full socialization.​[41]​ First, actors’ initial positions are characterized by rational calculation. Over time endogenous change sets in. In the second stage, the rational logic is replaced by cognitive role-playing. In the third stage, the logic of appropriateness drives processes allowing for normative suasion. Various factors impact on the speed of this process (and the likelihood of achieving full socialization); these include previously held attitudes towards cooperation (and global public goods) by participating actors, the intensity and rate of interaction, and the degree of autonomy from ministries (and interest groups) at home. Other social-constructivist work suggests that similar to any international bureaucrat, actors within IN-LAWs are tempted to use their legal, moral, and technical expertise for pursuing their interests, leading sometimes to pathological behaviour and undesired outcomes.​[42]​ While realists and neoliberal institutionalists might neglect the relevance of transgovernmental networks and IN-LAWs in international cooperation, the social-constructivist schools have emphasized primarily the agency of such networks and the diffusion of norms, projecting the organizational interests and expertise of members. There is still limited understanding of the interplay between formal and informal governance institutions in IR and the variable use of IN-LAW by the State and its agencies.​[43]​
E. Principal-agent theory and IN-LAW
In addressing some of the limits of standard IR theory, and moving towards offering a conceptual toolkit of international cooperation, we suggest analysing IN-LAW schemes within a principal-agent (PA) framework. PA helps overcome the myopic views of most social-constructivist and realist theories by combining external and internal sources of behaviour. While social-constructivism seems to over-emphasize run-away agents, realism pays too much attention to control instruments by big powers not allowing any meaningful autonomy within these networks to emerge. PA is mostly influenced by liberal institutionalist theory. It puts emphasis on the institutional design that accounts for the aggregation of preferences and autonomy for the different actors.​[44]​
In PA theory, the external sources are mainly represented by the principals’ interest constellation. PA helps capture the location of principals and their influence based on existing contracts along the chain of delegation. We might focus on ministries, national parliaments, or voters (in democratic systems) as the dominating principals (see Figure 3.2).
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If we treat IN-LAW networks as agents with delegated authority, the most influential principals are those most directly linked via the delegation chain to the final agents (eg executive agencies and ministers ). The agents are those mandated to represent the principals in an informal transgovernmental setting (IN-LAW ). The influence by parliaments () and by the ultimate principals (voters ) is usually limited, given the long delegation chain and strong informal processes,​[45]​ although Slaughter 2004 has argued that the embeddedness in and thus close oversight by executive agencies of transgovernmental networks in effect nests the IN-LAW practices directly within the system of domestic accountability down the chain of democratic delegation. Yet, accountability only works if parliaments invite or require national bureaucrats to report on the IN-LAW activities they have established. The limited reporting requirements in an informal network context can make transgovernmental networks in effect a long way detached from voters in a democratic system and few political parties would instrumentalize the work of IN-LAWs as an important election campaign topic. Such networks could, in fact, also be interpreted as mechanisms national executive agencies use to increase their agency autonomy vis-à-vis their domestic principals. More empirical work might shed light on the debate regarding the extent to which transgovernmental networks are invested with delegated authority, the nature of that authority, and activation of mechanisms of control and democratic accountability.​[46]​
IN-LAWs differ across various PA parameters. Therefore, in order to analyse the role and influence of the group of agents, we need to focus on the design of the contract (eg mandate, control tools by principals), principals’ vigilance, and agent preferences including the toolkit of strategies available to them. Only when we understand these PA parameters is it possible to assess the conditions under which IN-LAWs significantly impact performance.​[47]​ Let us briefly review the four steps of PA analysis.
First, who are the principals, what are their interests, and why do they delegate? Tackling these questions is important in order to explain individual and collective contracts between principals and agents. What is the nature of the task that is being delegated? The PA literature offers various reasons for delegation.​[48]​ The objective of the contract therefore creates different types of agents. In our context this could be agenda-setting agents, negotiation agents, or implementation agents. Under this rubric it would be important to consider to what extent, if at all, different transgovernmental networks involve delegated authority and creation of agents.​[49]​ As Hawkins et al (2006) have pointed out even formal intergovernmental cooperation can involve more, less, or no delegation to an agent (in their case a formal IO). It would therefore be important to know to what extent and through what mechanisms IN-LAW arrangements involve delegation to transgovernmental networks as agents.
Second, why and how do principals control? Delegation is naturally accompanied by control tools, some being more explicit than others. These include ex ante tools (screening an agent, appointment procedures), on the spot tools (regular reporting requirements), and ex post instruments (acceptance of outcomes, re-appointment, firing). Depending on the nature of the task delegated, the compositional effects of control tools vary. For example, if an implementation agent receives relatively substantial autonomy in order to maximize implementation benefit from its specialized skill or capacity, the selection process and the writing of the mandate appear more important than ex post or on-the-spot control. A negotiation agent will face more on-the-spot control through reporting based on repeated interaction. In addition, ex post control will work through the need to have outcomes accepted and through the use of re-appointment mechanisms by the principals. Control tools can also vary depending on the different types of contractual relationships in IN-LAW settings. At one level, there is a contractual relation between bureaucratic representatives in transgovernmental networks and their hierarchical superiors, the ministers or heads of agency, in the government bureaucracy. These relations are governed by formal as well as informal contracts and control mechanisms that may vary from one country to another. Ministers may also gather from time to time as a collective principal (eg in the context of the Basel Committee) and renew mandates applicable to the IN-LAW network as a whole or accept and control outcomes. Finally, certain networks and IN-LAWs can involve ministers and heads of agencies themselves, in which case the network would involve little delegation of authority, yet allow possible collusion of ministers as agents vis-à-vis their principals (eg parliament and the public).
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Third, what defines agent autonomy by design? As mentioned above, key features constraining agent autonomy are the clarity of the mandate, the agent selection process (eg screening) where principals attempt to choose agents with preferences similar to their own, and an array of oversight mechanisms; these include credible signals to agents that they should stick to the rules and should not follow other incentives that eventually lead to agency slippage or shirking. We posit that agent autonomy differs for the two types of IN-LAW public goods that we distinguish in Figure 3.1. Agents in objective-setting are generally more constrained than agents in service provision, leaving more wiggle room to the latter (see Figure 3.3). We posit that overall perceived distributional costs in objective-setting loom larger for principals than costs related to the implementation of pre-established norms and standards. Variation in the perception of implementation costs will lead to differences in terms of agency discretion for the types of public good conceptualized in this Chapter.​[50]​
Fourth, how do agents behave given the above-described constraints? Under what conditions do agents use their autonomy? Agents who are meeting in an informal setting will engage in forms of behaviour that could run counter to principals’ interests, partly because informal agreements and regulation are not subject to ratification and thus important mechanisms of formal control are eliminated or weakened. Both the social-constructivist and the PA literature also imply that informal networks facilitate bureaucratic agents and experts in pursuing organizational and normative objectives through convergence of interests towards a common cause facilitated by interaction, learning, and consensus building​[51]​ and through collective buffering of principals’ oversight.​[52]​ The potential divergence between agents’ actions and principals’ intentions, however, does not automatically incur societal costs as long as agents follow the long-term objective of providing public goods.
The issue area of climate change, which is characterized by varied and dense transnational governance,​[53]​ illustrates the variation in the extent and functional purposes of delegation to IN-LAWs, as anticipated by the PA model (Figure 3.3). Moreover, recent surveys of broad samples of transnational networks for climate governance, including private, public, and hybrid arrangements, show that while government agencies used predominantly transgovernmental networks to accomplish informal cooperation during the early to late 1990s, after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol there was a secular shift towards partnership arrangements with non-State actors targeting primarily service provision.​[54]​ Such trends in climate governance and other areas of dense network arrangements could explain the growing emphasis placed by the IR literature on private authority and public-private partnerships, and the relative neglect of IN-LAWs if conceptualized strictly as public networks of informal regulation.
A recently completed database of 60 transnational networks for climate governance reveals that only 14 of these networks involve predominantly public actors (the rest being hybrid or private in composition), and of these 14 public networks the majority involve transnational cooperation between cities and regional governments, rather than networks linking units of the central government.​[55]​ In the entire sample of 60 climate governance networks in the database, only two—the Major Economies Forum (created in 2009) and the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition (created in 2003)—involve only representatives of central government units. Both networks are classic examples of IN-LAW in that they seek to influence regulatory activity informally, primarily at the objective-setting stage of the policy process, and so far largely through agenda-setting (see Figure 3.1). Five other public networks in the Leverhulme database have characteristics of IN-LAW comprising regional governments. These networks include the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, the Memorandum of Understanding between Victoria (AUS) and California (USA), Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development, and the UK-California Initiative. They involve agreements between regional governments across two or more national jurisdictions and one informal bilateral agreement between a regional and a national government (the State of California and the UK). In terms of functions, the regional networks also seek to advance objective-setting and often a common platform of regulatory activity across sub-national regional governments. Some of these networks, for example the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers and RGGI, engage in both agenda-setting and standard-elaboration. The RGGI network is notable in that it involves informal activities of regional and transnational coordination, but ultimately has also produced formal regulations on greenhouse gas emission quotas and trading adopted by participating US States and Canadian Provinces.
As anticipated by the PA framework, trans-regional IN-LAWs involved in the goal-setting stage of the policy process with potentially significant distributive implications, tend to have limited autonomy from regional government units as they involve either directly the governors and premiers of regions, or their direct representatives. These cross-regional IN-LAWs further show that informal transnational governance can be exploited to advance the regulatory autonomy of sub-national governments, particularly in cases such as those of the US and Canada where regional jurisdictions already have a constitutional basis for regulatory activity. The proliferation of trans-regional IN-LAWs has potentially important implications for the balance of political influence and regulatory activity between national and sub-national authorities, which so far has not been fully explored by the literature.
The climate networks with service provision functions in the policy and regulatory cycle have become more numerous over time. They also reflect greater willingness to delegate authority and autonomy to transnational networks, as indicated by the growing share of public-private networks.​[56]​ Indeed the majority of networks (40 per cent) in the Leverhulme transnational climate governance database are of hybrid, public-private composition. During the early to late 1990s, climate networks with a service provision function, such as interpretation of convention requirements or capacity-building, were initiated primarily by foreign aid and multilateral agencies and involved representatives of governmental units and IOs.​[57]​ The signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which included provisions for a new set of market-based mechanisms and trading of greenhouse gas emission reduction units, was followed by a burst of interpretation, capacity-building, and implementation activities increasingly delegated to networks that also included non-State actors. Government agencies, particularly those of industrialized countries such as Canada, Japan, and a number of European countries, which supported the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol but at the same time anticipated relatively high costs of domestic compliance, needed to take advantage of the flexible mechanisms. Such agencies have facilitated numerous public-private partnership networks involving governmental counterparts in both developed and developing countries, and non-State actors with market and financial expertise.
Since governmental units have limited direct control over non-State actors, such hybrid networks have by design greater autonomy than purely transgovernmental networks. The public principals of public-private networks have to rely to a greater extent on outcome-based and external fire alarm types of control mechanisms for monitoring. These networks also increase the autonomy of sponsoring ministries and governmental and intergovernmental agencies vis-à-vis their domestic principals in the chain of delegation by allowing them to informally pursue a more activist international agenda than formally mandated by the legislative branch or the foreign policy establishment of the country. Indicative of such activism and buffering of domestic principals through informal transnational networks is that a large number of hybrid service-provision networks—about half of the 24 hybrid networks listed in the Leverhulme database for example—were initiated prior to 2005, which is when the Kyoto Protocol came into legal effect. As anticipated by the PA model (Figure 3.3) service-provision networks were entrusted with greater autonomy by their immediate principals to increase the consensus on the interpretation of the flexible mechanisms and to establish capacity for and experience with direct implementation even before the formal entry into force of the treaty. The PA framework thus helps to illuminate the political logic behind the rise and decline of different IN-LAWs and the variation in their functions and autonomy, with potentially important implications for the performance of such networks in contributing to public objectives.
F. Principal costs, agency costs, and performance
In addition to locating influence and control, PA theory is useful in highlighting eventual delegation costs (eg agency or principal costs) that emerge throughout the policy cycle. How do we define the two types of suboptimal outcomes which are rooted in inadequacies in design and behaviour? Principal costs develop as a result of inadequate delegation (at the beginning of the cycle). This hinders the agent’s ability to perform effectively when tackling the cooperation issue at hand. Thompson highlights three types of principal costs related to delegation: providing too few resources to carry out tasks (‘principal shirking’), absence of consensus and ambiguous mandates (‘principal drift’), and opportunistic behaviour by principals attempting to capture the agent (‘principal subversion’).​[58]​
Turning to agency costs, the literature usually differentiates various types of agency slack, eg agency shirking or agency slippage. The former is related to minimizing agents’ efforts while the latter is a clear departure from principals’ mandate.​[59]​ Slippage is more likely to produce higher agency costs. These accrue when agents follow their own particular interests (as a result of too little oversight) which in turn negatively affect overall performance.​[60]​
We posit that for any IN-LAW there exists a societal optimum where performance is highest and principal or agency costs are minimized. As mapped in Figure 3.4, we suggest a non-linear relationship between agency discretion and performance output (in the form of an inverted U-shape).
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We differentiate between two distinct paths for objective-setting and for service provisions. We suggest that performance is generally more volatile in service provision. One reason for this is that principals generally pay most attention to the setting of norms, rules, and standards and leave agents in service provision more autonomy from the start as illustrated above with the example of IN-LAWs and service provision networks for climate governance. Therefore, less constrained agents can more easily engage in mutual cooperation to focus on aggregate gains for those involved. Given more autonomy, these networks are also more likely to produce agency costs over time. In objective-setting we witness stronger concerns by principals early on which inhibit a sufficient degree of delegation resulting in certain principal costs (some IN-LAWs never achieve the optimum and agency costs and do not materialize). Overall, the relationship between agency discretion and performance for the objective-setting type of public goods is characterized by a flatter line (see Figure 3.4).
For any type of IN-LAW it is important to assess the PA relationship between ministries (individual principals) and their delegated representatives (individual agents). In addition, there is a need to focus on the effects of the existence of ministries (with potentially diverging interests) acting collectively (collective principals). Finally, on the agency side we need to focus on dynamic effects within IN-LAWs that develop common understandings and rules for interest aggregation. Therefore, after the study of individual PA relations the focus should turn to the inner life of the IN-LAWs and assess how interaction and convergence of ideas, for example, can contribute to overall good or bad performance (given benchmarks defined ex ante).​[61]​ Empirical work that pays attention to PA relations can in turn help us in assessing the conditions under which these types of governance models might blossom or degenerate. Yet, we posit that in most cases, IN-LAWs are characterized by sufficient principal oversight. These networks might be more likely to be hampered by principal costs than by agency costs, particularly at the goal-setting stage of the policy process, and most of their functions might still be situated on the left side of the performance optimum (Figure 3.4).
G. Conclusion
In this Chapter, we suggest that PA theory provides useful tools to approach the analysis of IN-LAWs from an IR and governance perspective. The PA framework developed here enables us to discuss the extent to which IN-LAWs constitute an additional informal layer of delegated authority in the international policy-making and law-making process. The framework takes into account the agency of different units of the government and their structural relations with domestic political principals on one hand and IN-LAWs on the other. On the basis of understanding the multiple PA relationships and the range of functional purposes for which IN-LAWs could be established, we have advanced specific propositions about the variety of IN-LAWs that can emerge in the transnational sphere and their underlying political drivers. Examples from the climate change regime illustrated the functional varieties of IN-LAWs and the differential degree of delegation of authority from their direct principals, as well as an increasing tendency towards greater delegation to hybrid public-private networks, particularly those with predominantly service provision functions.
The Chapter is thus intended above all to suggest a theoretical framework that can inform further empirical analysis of the politics of IN-LAWs, and their interplay with international and domestic institutions and law. We have abstained from offering normative frameworks to assess legitimacy or accountability. The PA perspective, however, suggests that concerns about political control and agency losses can affect network design and performance, with implications for their legitimacy and accountability. Further research on the micro-structure of individual IN-LAWs should be encouraged both to test some of the implications of the theory of delegation and to examine in detail their structure, performance, and sources of (or lack of) legitimacy.
The final issue, which we would like to emphasize, is the interaction effects between the State actors and third parties in IN-LAWs. The more active private parties are in the setting of standards or the provision of services (either within the same IN-LAW scheme or in competing schemes), the more we need to complement the classical PA analysis with approaches that focus on strategic interaction with so-called third parties.​[62]​ In this respect more attention needs to be paid, in the PA literature, to the ways principals work with third parties to control agents, or to how agents collude with market actors to push through their preferences. The politics of IN-LAW is closely entangled with domestic and international formal political processes and structures, as well as with the rise of new private actors in the international regulatory domain.
Figure 3.1: IN-LAWs alongside the policy cycle
Figure 3.2: Delegation chains
Notes:  voters in democratic countries A, C, D, E;  parliaments or national assemblies (A-E);  government with specialized agencies/ministries (A-F);  IN-LAW as the ultimate agent.
Figure 3.3: Agency discretion and the nature of the task
Notes: Services provision (shaded in grey); objective-setting (cross-hatched)
Figure 3.4: The performance optimum and PA costs
Notes: Agency discretion increasing over time; dotted line represents the objective-setting path; unbroken line represents services provision path; principal costs (vertical dashes); agency costs (vertical lines).
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